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Building Trust amidst Corruption in
Bangladesh
COLIN KNOX
School of Policy Studies, University of Ulster, UK
ABSTRACT Bangladesh’s parliamentary elections in December 2008 witnessed a landslide
victory for an alliance led by Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League following two years of a caretaker
government backed by the military. The country’s beleaguered population faced the twin
challenges of natural disasters and pervasive poverty. One of the key factors inﬂuencing trust in
the government of Bangladesh is stability, which has been in short supply because of
confrontational politics between the two largest parties and accompanying violence. This paper
considers eﬀorts to rebuild trust by examining the work of a social movement, Transparency
International Bangladesh (TIB), at two levels: strengthening the pillars of the national integrity
system (with a speciﬁc focus on parliament), and holding public bodies to account for corrupt
practice in delivering key services. People’s experiences of services delivered through schools,
hospitals and local government have resulted in a complete collapse in trust in public bodies. The
commitment of the democratically elected government to tackle corruption at all levels will be a
key determinant of whether trust and stability can emerge from the volatility of Bangladesh’s
politics.
KEY WORDS: Bangladesh, corruption, Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), trust,
National Integrity System, voice, accountability
Introduction
The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, became an
independent state after the civil war of 1971 and joined the Commonwealth in
1972. It is a densely populated South Asian country with some 142 million people
who commonly experience natural disasters in the form of ﬂoods and cyclones in the
ﬂat land and delta of rivers on the Bay of Bengal. Poverty is widespread with GDP
per head estimated at just $444 in 2007, or almost half the population living on less
than one dollar per day (Oxford Economics, 2008). Since independence, Bangladesh
has experienced political turbulence and spent 15 years under military rule until
democracy was restored in 1991. Continuing unrest and violence have been a major
impediment to economic growth set alongside the increasing strength of Islamic
fundamentalism.
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Politics have been dominated and polarised by the two largest political parties,
long-time rivals the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party
(BNP). The October 2001 elections produced a BNP victory in the form of a four-
party alliance. The opposition party, Awami League, refused to accept the result and
from 2001–2006 their attendance at parliament was sporadic, claiming discrimina-
tion by the BNP speaker. Violence and political strikes/hartals have accompanied
the political turmoil. In August 2004, 20 people were killed and more than 100
injured in a grenade attack at an Awami League political rally. In January 2005 the
former ﬁnance minister, Shah Kibria, was assassinated along with four colleagues
and over 70 injured in an attack at an AL rally in Northern Bangladesh. Since
summer 2006 opposition parties, directed by Awami League, claimed that the BNP-
led government was seeking to manipulate the electoral infrastructure and
announced in January 2007 a boycott of the general election. The parliamentary
elections were cancelled. On 11 January 2007, the President declared a state of
emergency and a reconstituted unelected military-backed caretaker government was
put in place. Parliamentary elections were held on 29 December 2008 to a new
civilian government after two years of emergency rule.
One of the most fundamental obstacles to building trust in Bangladesh is the
pervasiveness of corruption at many levels: parliament, elections, and the delivery of
core public services. People feel powerless to address the excesses of corruption and
have lost faith in the democratic system. The role of the caretaker government was
to: move Bangladesh beyond the entrenched politics of the two main parties,
improve governance structures, tackle patronage and the abuse of political position
and, in so doing, to establish trust in the democratic process. This paper considers
the ‘success’ of building and maintaining trust in Bangladesh’s parliamentary
democracy.
Conceptualising Trust in Bangladesh
Trust is an ambiguous and multi-faceted concept. Bovens and Wille (2008) argue
that trust can be considered a litmus test of how well government is perceived in the
eyes of citizens. Low trust ‘‘is usually understood as an indication that some elements
of the political system—politicians, institutions, or both—are functioning poorly; or
that the expectation of citizens are too high’’ (Bovens and Wille, 2008, p. 284). Other
writers see this combination as problematic in operationalising the concept of trust.
Catterberg and Moreno (2005) claim it is diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate between trust in
political institutions and government, and the evaluation of government perfor-
mance. Their empirical work on measuring trust in new and established democracies
focused on political institutions, rather than government performance, on the basis
that conﬁdence in the institutions reﬂected people’s evaluation of the political
environment.
This contrasts with research conducted by Kim (2005, p. 615) who argued that
‘‘conﬁdence in government performance, along with credible commitment and
fairness in procedure, is an important variable for attaining the trustworthiness of
government’’. For the purposes of this paper, we adopt a classiﬁcation developed by
Nye (1997) who attributed economic, social-cultural, or political factors as causally
linked to changes in trust in government. The detail of these factors are summarised
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by Chanley et al. (2000). First, trust in government is inﬂuenced by the performance
of the national economy and citizens’ evaluations of the economy. Negative
perceptions of the economy promote greater distrust in government. Second,
declining trust has been attributed to social-cultural factors such as rising crime and
child poverty. Finally, changes in trust in government have been linked to numerous
political factors, including citizens’ evaluations of incumbents and institutions, an
increasing number of political scandals, ever more media focus on political
corruption and scandal, and the end of the Cold War. We return to this classiﬁcation
as a way of trying to understand the causes of declining trust in Bangladesh.
There are two key ways of conceptualising trust in Bangladesh—at the macro and
micro levels. At the macro level one useful model is the National Integrity System
developed by Transparency International (see Figure 1). The National Integrity
System is like a Greek Temple, the foundations of which are an active and engaged
Bangladesh citizenry who can participate in free and fair elections and hold
government to account (voice and accountability) by exhibiting core values such as
democracy, justice and freedom of expression. The roof of the temple is the nation’s
integrity system buttressed by a series of mutually reinforcing pillars whose strength
determines whether Bangladesh will have key societal outcomes: sustainable
development, quality of life and the rule of law. If some of the pillars are weak
then the national integrity system will suﬀer, although trade-oﬀs are possible—
restricted media freedom might be compensated by an eﬃcient civil service or strong
civil society. Alamgir et al. (2006) describe the model as the sum total of the
institutions and practices within Bangladesh that address aspects of maintaining
honesty and integrity of government and building trust amongst its citizens. They
argue that while the pillars are interdependent, each contributing to the strength of
the other, the role of an eﬀective parliament is a sine qua non for the national
Figure 1. Conceptualising trust in Bangladesh.
Source: Adapted from Pope (2000).
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integrity system to function properly and to gain the trust of the population of
Bangladesh.
Yet in a study of national integrity systems in South Asia, Aminuzzaman (2006, p.
6) concluded:
In Bangladesh, confrontational politics, a poor parliamentary culture and the
dominant and sometimes intolerant attitude of the party in power tend to mar
the spirit and modality of its operational business—which in many cases has
resulted in continuous boycotting and abstinence by the major opposition party.
Iftekharuzzman (2007) described the roles of the parliament of Bangladesh (Jatiya
Sangsad) in a representative democracy as: a forum for debate on behalf of citizens
on matters of public interest; a law-making body; and an institution for ensuring
accountability of the government by oversight through properly functioning
committees. On all three counts he argued, ‘‘parliament within 15 years of its
restoration managed to badly damage its credibility and public trust’’ (Iftekharuzz-
man, 2007, p. 1).
At the micro level one of the more obvious manifestations of trust between citizen
and the state is their direct experiences of public services delivery (Swedish
International Development Agency, 2008). The Constitution of the People’s
Republic of Bangladesh (Government of Bangladesh, 2004, article 15) enshrines a
duty of care on the State to provide basic public services. We can capture people’s
direct experiences of the public provision of health and education services and the
state’s betrayal of trust from data gathered through the 2007 National Household
Survey (a 5,000 household interview probability survey selected across 52 districts,
out of 64, within Bangladesh—see also additional data: BRAC University, 2008).
Data from the survey revealed that 72.6% of respondents (n¼ 3,629) had used
education services in the previous 12 months (Transparency International
Bangladesh, 2008). This level of service usage represented the highest interaction
between citizen and the public sector examined in the survey. Other services
examined were: electricity, health, NGOs, banking, tax, land administration, local
government, law enforcement and the judiciary. In terms of the experiences of
education service users, 34.7% of them (n¼ 1,260) had encountered corruption in
education under various guises: bribery, negligence of duties, nepotism, embezzle-
ment or deception. The breakdown of these ﬁgures is shown in Figure 2. The largest
form of corruption in the experience of users was negligence of duties by teachers
involving such things as: poor time keeping, irregular classes (absenteeism), delays in
releasing exam results and lack of interest and motivation by teachers in their jobs.
The survey data also showed that 44.7% of respondents (n¼ 2,234) had used
health services in the previous 12 months. In terms of their experiences as service
users, 41.8% of them (n¼ 934) had encountered corruption in health under various
guises: bribery, negligence of duties, nepotism, embezzlement or deception. The
breakdown of these ﬁgures is shown in Figure 3 where bribery and negligence are
the highest forms of corruption experienced by health service users. These will take
the form of: doctors charging for writing prescriptions, referring patients to their
private clinics and having to pay extra fees for pathological tests in government
health facilities.
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How is Trust Measured?
If trust is conceived in Bangladesh as a strong national integrity system and
tackling corruption, how is it measured? Because trust is an amorphous concept,
there are two possible surrogate indicators—Worldwide Governance Indicators
(World Bank) and the Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency Interna-
tional).
Worldwide Governance Indicators measure six broad constituents of what has
been deﬁned in its broadest sense as ‘governance’, that is, voice and accountability,
political stability and absence of violence, government eﬀectiveness, regulatory
quality, rule of law and control of corruption (Kaufmann et al., 2008). The most
relevant indicator when considering trust in government is ‘voice and account-
ability’. This indicator measures the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to
participate in selecting their government—free and fair elections, trust in parliament,
satisfaction with democracy, as well as freedom of expression and association, and a
free media. Figure 4 shows the percentile rank of Bangladesh, compared with other
South Asian countries, measured on the variable ‘voice and accountability’.
Percentile rank indicates the percentage of countries worldwide that rate below
these countries. Higher values indicate better governance arrangements. In the case
of Bangladesh therefore, 28.8% of countries rate worse on ‘voice and accountability’
in 2007. Figure 5 shows the declining levels of trust in Bangladesh from 41.8% to
28.8% over the period 1998–2007.
Given the potential for corruption in Bangladesh to destroy trust in government,
the annual Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is a
surrogate indicator of whether there is a perceived improvement or deterioration in
trust. The CPI ranks countries on a scale of 0–10 (1¼ highly corrupt; 10¼ highly
clean). In the most recent results (2008), Bangladesh scored 2.1 and ranked 10th
from the bottom among 180 countries (Transparency International, 2008). During
the period 2001–2005, Bangladesh was bottom of the list for ﬁve successive years. It
has improved its score from 2.0 to 2.1. There has been criticism of the validity of the
index (Sik, 2002), not least because it is measuring perceived rather than actual
corruption, but when set alongside the National Household Survey (discussed
Figure 2. Corruption in education (n¼ 1260).
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above) both indicate that ‘‘pervasive corruption remains unabated in Bangladesh’’
(Transparency International Bangladesh, 2008, p. viii).
Building Trust—Macro Level
It is clear from the discussions so far that there is a signiﬁcant trust deﬁcit in
Bangladesh due largely to political instability, lack of conﬁdence in the democratic
process and the pervasiveness of corruption. It is ironic that a military-backed
caretaker regime which seized power in January 2007 saw its main task as building
trust in the democratic process to prepare for parliamentary elections. A state of
emergency was declared and citizens’ constitutional rights suspended. The
caretaker government believed they could deliver better government than the
Figure 3. Corruption in health (n¼ 934).
Figure 4. Trust in South Asian countries.
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notoriously corrupt Bangladesh politicians. There were allegations from Awami
League that the Bangladesh Nationalist Party had compiled a list of up to 14
million fake names and was planning massive electoral fraud in the 2007 elections.
The caretaker government launched a major anti-corruption drive by detaining
more than 200 politicians and business leaders. By the end of 2007 the Ministry of
Home Aﬀairs had arrested almost ½ million people. The two former prime
ministers (Sheikh Hasina Wajed and Khaleda Zia) were jailed on corruption
charges.
The caretaker government also worked hard to establish trust through major
institutional reforms of the country’s national integrity system. The Election
Commission was reconstituted following allegations of partisanship and electoral
laws amended to tackle fraud. The Public Service Commission, the appointments
body for civil servants, was reformed to include procedures which make the entrance
examination system more transparent and credible with the right of appeal. The
inept Bureau of Anti-Corruption was abolished and replaced with an independent
Anti-Corruption Commission. In a historic move, the Judiciary was separated from
the Executive demonstrating the importance of a strong and independent judiciary to
ensure fair and transparent trials for all. As the tenure of the caretaker government
lengthened however, foreign governments and donors which had supported the
army’s intervention became increasingly worried about the rising number of human
rights abuses and the slow pace of electoral reform, and called for lifting the state of
emergency and early elections. Public support for the caretaker government also
evaporated in the second year due to poor economic management which was in part
hampered by natural disasters and a fall in domestic and foreign investment as a
result of political uncertainty.
Figure 5. Bangladesh: declining trust over time.
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In December 2008, ahead of the parliamentary elections, the President of
Bangladesh (Iajddin Ahmed) lifted curbs on political and civil rights and press
freedom, ending the state of emergency which had lasted for almost two years. The
interim government failed in its attempt to create an alternative to the two main
political parties and sideline the two ‘battling begums’ (Muslim women of high rank:
Sheikh Hasina and Zia) whose political tenure had been characterised by rampant
corruption and entrenched politics. The Anti-Corruption Commission has had little
success with its concentration on high proﬁle cases, due to a mix of poor legal work
and inadequate training amongst its investigators. Legal procedures were breached
during investigations and cases were rejected by the courts. The Commission has also
been unable to tackle the systemic patronage which aﬀects the daily lives of most
Bangladeshis. The caretaker government raised expectations in its anti-corruption
drive but ordinary citizens were extremely frustrated by its failure. The military’s
vision of a reformed state remained unfulﬁlled.
Building Trust—Micro Level
If building trust at the macro level has been unsuccessful, there is evidence of
eﬀective micro level activities. Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) has
worked throughout the country as a social movement at the grassroots level to build
trust amongst public service users. They do this through various mechanisms:
committees of concerned citizens; volunteer youth groups; advice and information
desks; report cards; and people’s theatre. Considering just one of these initiatives,
Committees of Concerned Citizens (CCCs) are local-level watchdogs and a key pillar
in TIB’s social movement against corruption. The CCCs are groups of citizens with a
high degree of moral and social standing/credibility who motivate and mobilise
citizens in various activities designed to curb corruption and promote good
governance. Apart from various anti-corruption awareness activities, the focus of the
CCCs’ watchdog functions is normally on key public services such as education,
health, and local government. There are 36 CCCs working in 34 districts across all
six divisions in Bangladesh. We consider their activities in these three sectors.
Evidence of the eﬀectiveness of this grassroots trust building work is drawn from a
wider study on the impact of their work across Bangladesh which included in-depth
case study work in schools, hospitals and municipalities (Knox, 2009).
The Health Sector
CCC members and volunteer youth groups have worked consistently with hospitals
in districts throughout Bangladesh to improve health services. They have met with
the authorities and identiﬁed gaps in their provision. They prepared information
booklets about the nature and types of health care services available which they
distributed through satellite advice and information desks. In addition, youth groups
have organised public theatre shows to access illiterate people and raise awareness of
their rights to public health provision. As a result, there have been some signiﬁcant
developments in health provision such as an improvement in the ticketing system
(each patient entering a hospital receives a ticket as a form of queuing system).
Previously, the price of a ticket for services in the out-patients department was 4.40
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taka, but patients paid 5.00 taka due to ‘lack of change’ being available (a form of
corruption). Now a fund has been created for patients in poverty with the extra 60
paisa received from each ticket. Medicine supplies were also very low. Following
interventions by the CCC, supplies have increased and the list of medicines available
is on public display. The behaviour of doctors, nurses and ancillary staﬀ towards
patients has also improved. An ambulance service is available for which patients do
not make additional payments, patients tests are carried out in the pathology
departments of the hospitals (as opposed to a private clinic) and toilet facilities have
been signiﬁcantly improved. Finally, the issue of cleanliness is a higher priority
although has still some way to go.
The Education Sector
The CCCs actively engage with primary schools in districts throughout Bangladesh,
a key improvement being the signiﬁcant number of eligible students now enrolled in
schools. Student attendance had not been satisfactory and CCCs intervened to
address this and other issues. They met with school management committees and
guardians, organised workshops and promotional campaigns along with awards
aimed at incentivising attendance. As a result, student enrolments have increased
and text books are available for free distribution to students. The scholarship pass
rate has also improved. Teachers, the school management committees and guardians
are now jointly engaged in providing better education for the children in an
accountable and transparent way. Teacher attendance and performance in their jobs
are being closely monitored by CCCs.
The Local Government Sector
The work of CCCs in this sector starts with the publication of report cards (a review
of local government services) which have highlighted mismanagement and attracted
widespread and critical press coverage of local authorities. Following on from this,
CCC members have actively engaged with elected bodies to take forward the
recommendations outlined in the report cards. In addition, ‘face-the-public’
meetings have been organised between senior oﬃcials of the Union Parishad/
Municipality and local citizens during which information leaﬂets are distributed
containing details of services available to the public. Signiﬁcant changes are evident
in local government. These include: a number of roads in a bad state of disrepair
have been ﬁxed; new tube wells have been set up in some areas and the water is now
arsenic-free. Tax collection has increased and the number of social beneﬁts improved
for the disabled, the elderly and widows. Bribes paid to obtain a trade licence have
now been stopped. The Union Parishad/Municipality budgets have been published
for the ﬁrst time. Local citizens were dissatisﬁed with the opaque process of
distributing vulnerable group feeding (VGF) cards. The CCCs became involved in
this issue resulting in an increase in the numbers distributed and much greater
transparency in the process.
External donor-assisted work by Transparency International Bangladesh at the
micro level therefore provides evidence of grassroots activities working to change
attitudes and behaviour amongst public service providers. Whether this work can
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D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Un
iv
er
si
ty
 o
f 
Ul
st
er
] 
At
: 
09
:3
0 
22
 J
ul
y 
20
09
survive and grow in the restored democratic system remains to be seen. There is a
disconnect between trust building at the macro and micro levels—a greater focus on
sectoral-based public services reform may well provide bottom-up momentum for
systemic change.
Conclusion
On 29 December 2008 more than 80 million Bangladeshis went to the polls to choose
a government for the ﬁrst time since 2001 in what international observers judged to
be free, fair and credible parliamentary elections. Voting turnout was high at over
80% and the most peaceful in decades—a stark contrast to the failed elections of
2007, which dissolved into street riots and prompted emergency rule. An alliance led
by Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League secured a landslide victory winning more than
two-thirds (231) of the 300 parliamentary seats over her arch opponent,
Bangladesh’s last Prime Minister BNP leader Khaleda Zia (BNP won 29 seats).
Previous experience has shown that losing parties are unwilling to accept the results
leading to anarchy and a refusal to work the democratic process. The BNP alleged
widespread vote-rigging and fraud and lodged a complaint with the Election
Commission. One political analyst (A. Rahman, cited in Alam 2008, p. 1)
commented on the election results: ‘‘Hasina has promised to bring down food
prices and reduce corruption. The ordinary people trust her more than Zia, whose
rule is fresh in their memory. They wanted to give Hasina another chance’’ (author’s
emphasis). The BNP has already engaged in previous tactics by staging walk-out
protests in the new Parliament. A mutiny (February 2009) by the Bangladesh Riﬂes
border patrol paramilitaries (BDR) over low pay and status relative to the army was
quickly quashed by Hasina, enhancing her reputation as a result. That said, there are
some worrying signs which may impact negatively on people’s willingness to trust the
new regime. Speciﬁcally, the government has drawn up plans to replace the head of
the independent Anti-Corruption Commission and reorganise the body. Critics
allege Hasina wants to make it a toothless organisation.
Returning to Nye’s (1997) classiﬁcation of factors which cause changes in trust in
government is instructive when trying to understand where Bangladesh could go
from here. Trust, he argued, was causally linked to economic, social-cultural or
political factors. Although Bangladesh has achieved signiﬁcant economic growth
since independence in 1971, over the last few years its annual economic growth has
been around 6% while soaring food prices pushed inﬂation above 10% in the ﬁscal
year to June 2008. The new government may beneﬁt in the short run from a global
slowdown in food and fuel prices but long-term problems exist in the agriculture
sector, not least because of energy shortages. The key social-cultural issues in
Bangladesh are the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger and vulnerability to
disasters/climate changes. Analysts suggest that the economy needs to grow by more
than 7% each year for Bangladesh to become a middle-income country by 2020, and
by more than 8% to halve poverty by 2015. Bangladesh remains hugely at risk from
ﬂooding and cyclones/tropical storms.
A stable government would however be an important factor in establishing
trust amongst Bangladesh citizens. Confrontational politics and violence have
become ‘‘a serious threat to democracy and development in Bangladesh’’ (Rahaman,
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2007, p. 101). If the 2008 election results spark the chaos, boycott of parliament, lack
of political compromise and violence which have characterised the past, then
building trust in government becomes impossible. The military, having failed to
break the duopoly of political leaders/parties, will want to see whether the new
government moves beyond entrenched politics and associated violence, and starts to
tackle endemic corruption, all impediments to foreign aid and investment in
Bangladesh. Without combined progress on these economic, socio-cultural and
politics factors the prospects of building trust in the new government of Bangladesh
look bleak.
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